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Abstract 
We report the first electrophysiological investigation of the inverse base-rate effect 
(IBRE), a robust non-rational bias in predictive learning. In the IBRE, participants 
learn that one pair of symptoms (AB) predicts a frequently occurring disease, whilst 
an overlapping pair of symptoms (AC) predicts a rarely occurring disease. 
Participants subsequently infer that BC predicts the rare disease, a non-rational 
decision made in opposition to the underlying base rates of the two diseases. Error-
driven attention theories of learning state the IBRE occurs because C attracts more 
attention than B. On the basis of this account we predicted and observed the 
occurrence of brain potentials associated with visual attention: a posterior Selection 
Negativity, and a concurrent anterior Selection Positivity, for C vs. B in a post-
training test phase. Error-driven attention theories further predict no Selection 
Negativity, Selection Positivity or IBRE, for control symptoms matched on frequency 
to B and C, but for which there was no shared symptom (A) during training. These 
predictions were also confirmed, and this confirmation discounts alternative 
explanations of the IBRE based on the relative novelty of B and C. Further, we 
observed higher response accuracy for B alone than for C alone; this dissociation of 
response accuracy (B > C) from attentional allocation (C > B) discounts the 
possibility that the observed attentional difference was caused by the difference in 
response accuracy.  
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1. Introduction 
 We seem to learn more about events for which our initial predictions were 
incorrect than we do about events for which our initial predictions were correct—the 
element of surprise seems conducive to learning (Kamin, 1969). Using an event-
related potential methodology, Wills et al. (2007) provided evidence that one process 
underlying this phenomenon is the rapid re-direction of visual attention in response to 
prediction errors. Specifically, Wills et al. (2007) found a brain potential previously 
associated with attention to features (e.g. shape, color, spatial frequency)—the 
selection negativity (SN)—for a cue involved in multiple prediction errors, relative to 
an equally frequent control cue involved in fewer prediction errors. In the current 
article, we report that a comparable event-related component is observed in the 
inverse base-rate effect—a robust non-rational preference observed in post-category-
learning decision making (Medin & Edelson, 1988).  
 The inverse base-rate procedure, in its canonical form, can be considered both 
as a category-learning phenomenon (because it involves inference from learned items 
to unseen items, see Pothos & Wills, 2011), and a predictive learning phenomenon 
(because it involves learning to predict outcomes on the basis of presented stimuli).  
For this reason, we use the terms ‘predictive learning’ and ‘category learning’ inter-
changeably in the current article, although we accept that they are not entirely 
synonymous when considering the associative- and category- learning literatures in 
their entirety (see e.g. Bott, Hoffman & Murphy, 2007). 
 In the sections that follow, we describe the inverse base-rate effect, explain how 
the effect may be accommodated by theories of error-driven attention, and justify our 
prediction of the presence of a SN on the basis of these theories and related work. An 
experiment testing this prediction is then reported. 
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1.1. The inverse base-rate effect 
 Imagine the following fictitious scenario. You are a physician in training who 
has just seen a series of patients. You have noticed that all patients with the symptoms 
dizziness and skin rash have Jominy fever, whilst all patients with dizziness and back 
pain have Phipp’s syndrome. You have seen three times as many cases of Jominy 
fever as you have of Phipp’s syndrome. The next patient you see has back pain and 
skin rash. Is this patient more likely to have Jominy fever or Phipp’s syndrome? 
 When posed the question in this manner, people typically answer that Jominy 
fever is more likely (Johansen et al., 2007). Such an answer is not unreasonable 
because, in the microcosm of this scenario, skin rash perfectly predicts Jominy fever, 
and back pain perfectly predicts Phipp’s syndrome, but Jominy fever is more common 
overall. Indeed, medical students are often encouraged to heed the aphorism “when 
you hear hoof beats behind you, don’t expect to see a zebra” (Imperato, 1979). In the 
presence of two perfectly predictive but conflicting symptoms, the underlying base 
rates of the diseases provide one basis on which to make a decision. The current 
article focuses on the opposite result where participants respond that a patient with 
back pain and skin rash is more likely to have the rare disease Phipp’s syndrome. This 
non-rational response bias is robustly found when participants are presented with the 
same information sequentially as a series of cases (e.g. Juslin et al., 2001; Kruschke, 
1996; Lamberts & Kent, 2007; Medin & Edelson, 1988; Sherman et al., 2009). 
 One class of theory of this inverse base-rate effect (IBRE) is that it is a relative-
novelty effect (Binder & Estes, 1966). This theory combines the idea that novel or 
surprising events are particularly memorable (Rhetorica ad Herennium, 85BC; Von 
Restorff, 1933), with the availability heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973), which 
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states that memorable events are judged more probable. The idea that the IBRE is 
driven by the relative novelty of the two diseases is disconfirmed by the fact that 
participants predict the common disease if presented with just the symptom common 
to both diseases (dizziness), a response that is consistent with the underlying base 
rates. Participants also predict the common disease if presented with all three 
symptoms (dizziness, skin rash and back pain; see e.g. Kruschke, 1996); this response 
is also consistent with the underlying base rates and inconsistent with a relative 
disease novelty account of the IBRE. 
 Another variant of the relative-novelty explanation of the IBRE focuses on the 
relative novelty of the symptoms. The symptom back pain is relatively novel in this 
scenario compared to skin rash, which makes it more memorable, and hence its 
associated disease (Phipp’s syndrome) is judged more probable. However, this 
version of a relative-novelty account is disconfirmed by the observation that the IBRE 
is only observed if there is a shared cue during training (Kruschke, 2001a; Medin & 
Edelson, 1988; Medin & Robbins, 1971). The shared cue in the above example is 
dizziness, which occurs in all presented cases. If the shared cue is replaced by further 
perfectly predictive cues, base-rate following is observed. For example, if dizziness 
and skin rash predict the common disease Jominy fever, but ear ache and back pain 
predict the rare disease Phipp’s syndrome, then participants’ modal response to the 
symptom combination skin rash and back pain is now Jominy fever, in agreement 
with the underlying base rates. Under a relative novelty account, the IBRE should still 
be observed, because back pain is more novel than skin rash. In summary, the shared-
cue effect disconfirms the relative-novelty account of the IBRE. 
 The shared-cue effect also disconfirms the eliminative-inference account 
suggested by Juslin et al. (2001). For an extended discussion of this point see 
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Kruschke (2001a) but, in essence, the eliminative-inference account proposes that 
participants are more likely to remember what skin rash predicts than what back pain 
predicts because they see skin rash more often. Faced with novel symptom 
combination skin rash and back pain, participants may therefore forget what back pain 
predicts (the rare disease) but remember what skin rash predicts (the common 
disease). However, skin rash plus back pain is a novel symptom combination and 
participants are assumed (under eliminative inference theory) to respond to this novel 
combination with a novel response. Specifically, they respond that skin rash and back 
pain predict the rare disease, because this is a novel response (responding “common 
disease” would be the familiar response because it is brought to mind by the more 
frequent symptom skin rash). Such a theory applies equally in the presence or absence 
of a shared cue, yet the IBRE effect depends on the presence of a shared cue. Hence, 
the shared-cue effect disconfirms the eliminative-inference account of the IBRE. 
--- Table 1 about here, please --- 
 Although the above examples of the IBRE involve verbal descriptions of 
symptoms within a fictitious medical scenario, the IBRE has also been observed with 
abstract pictorial stimuli, and in non-medical scenarios (Binder & Estes, 1966; 
Johansen et al., 2010; Lamberts & Kent, 2007; Kalish, 2001; Sherman et al., 2009). 
We therefore subsequently discuss the IBRE and the shared-cue effect in terms of 
their abstract structure, which is summarized in Table 1. In Table 1, A is the shared 
cue, B and D are perfect predictors of the common disease com, C and E are perfect 
predictors of the rare disease rare, and F and G are further perfect predictors whose 
main role is to replace the shared cue. The result that the rare outcome is more likely 
to be predicted than the common outcome in response to a particular cue combination 
can be represented as: rare > com. Thus, the three key results of the IBRE and 
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shared-cue effect, expressed in terms of the abstract design of Table 1 are (1) com < 
rare for BC, (2) com > rare for DE, and (3) com > rare for A. In interpreting Table 1, 
it is important to note that compounds (e.g. AB) are presented simultaneously – in 
other words, the two component cues (e.g. A and B in AB) appear on the screen at the 
same time.  It is also important to note that trial order is randomized, and thus the 
order of the rows in Table 1 is arbitrary.  
 
 
1.2. Error-driven attention 
 Certain error-driven attention theories of learning (e.g. Kruschke, 2001b) can 
accommodate both the IBRE and the shared-cue effect. These theories are expressed 
in mathematical terms but, for current purposes, a natural-language approximation 
(Wills & Pothos, 2012) will suffice. The central concept behind these theories of 
error-driven attention is that people re-direct their attention to particular components 
of a presented stimulus in order to minimize future prediction errors. In the context of 
the IBRE, one has to make the additional assumption that participants learn more 
quickly about what predicts the common outcome than about what predicts the rare 
outcome. Such an assumption is not unreasonable given that participants see the 
common disease more often, and it is supported by previous studies of the IBRE (e.g. 
Kruschke, 1996, Figure 1).  
 In approximate terms, the explanation provided by error-driven attention theory 
on the basis of these premises is as follows. Relatively early in the case series, 
participants learn AB → com. This leads them to initially predict AC → com, because 
of the similarity of AC to AB. The participant’s prediction turns out to be wrong, 
because AC → rare. The participant concludes that it was cue A that led to this 
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erroneous prediction (nothing has been learned about C yet). Error-driven attention 
theory states that people act to reduce the likelihood of a subsequent error in 
predicting the outcome of AC by reducing the attention paid to A and increasing the 
attention paid to C. The cue B does not see a corresponding increase in attention, 
because the participant has already learned AB → com. When AB was originally 
learned, the participant knew nothing about A or B, so any initial errors would not 
lead to B being differentially attended relative to A. 
 When subsequently asked about the cue combination BC, these error-driven 
changes in attention are assumed to persist, and thus C attracts more attention than B. 
This difference in attention is presumably sufficiently large that C (which is 
associated with the rare disease) dominates the decision. Note that this explanation of 
the IBRE, like the IBRE itself, depends on the presence of the shared cue A. In the 
absence of A, base-rate following is expected because there is no shared cue to cause 
the re-direction of attention, and the participant has had more opportunity to learn 
about D than E, because D occurs more often. For similar reasons, A presented alone 
leads to the common outcome being predicted, because A has been followed by com 
more often than it has been followed by rare. 
 
1.3. Correlates of selective attention  
 An extensive literature on the ERP correlates of selective attention to perceptual 
attributes has revealed a number of brain potentials elicited or modulated by attention. 
In the visual modality these include the P1 and N1 peaks of the ERP waveform, and 
the difference potentials N2pc, Selection Negativity (SN) and Selection Positivity 
(SP) obtained by subtraction of the ERPs for unattended/non-target stimuli from those 
for attended/target stimuli (for reviews see Hillyard & Anllo-Vento, 1998; Luck et al., 
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2000). Of particular relevance for the current study are the potentials elicited by non-
spatial attention (attention to features such as color, shape and spatial frequency): SN, 
which has a posterior scalp distribution and is sometimes preceded or accompanied by 
SP over the anterior scalp (cf. Anllo-Vento & Hillyard , 1996). Feature-based 
attention can also elicit the N2pc potential, but this requires lateralized presentation of 
target features, which was not a feature of the current study, hence the present focus 
on SN and SP. Importantly, SN has been previously observed in response to a cue 
involved in multiple prediction errors relative to an equally frequent cue involved in 
fewer prediction errors. Specifically, Wills et al. (2007) employed a forward cue 
competition design in which participants first learned that cue A predicted the 
presence of a disease, whilst cue B predicted the absence of that disease. Participants 
subsequently learned that cue combination AX predicted the presence of the disease 
and that cue combination BY also predicted the presence of the disease (filler cues 
predicted the absence of the disease in this phase). The critical part of this design is 
that participants tend to make fewer prediction errors on AX than on BY. By the end 
of this second training phase, cues X and Y have thus been presented an equal number 
of times, but Y has been involved in more prediction errors than X. In a subsequent 
test phase in which X and Y were presented singly in the absence of feedback, Wills 
et al. (2007) found a SN for Y relative to X. This result is consistent with the idea that 
the difference in prediction errors led to a difference in attention to Y compared to X, 
a difference that persisted beyond the training phase and outside the context of the 
specific training stimuli (AX and BY). 
 The current study employed the same shape-based stimuli as Wills et al. (2007) 
in an IBRE procedure (see Table 1). As previously stated, certain error-driven 
attention theories (e.g. Kruschke, 2001) predict that, after training on AB → com and 
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AC → rare, C will be more attended than B. Given the evidence that the attentional 
changes predicted by error-driven attention theory can be indexed by a SN (Wills et 
al., 2007), our prediction was that a SN would be observed to cue C relative to cue B. 
In addition, the same error-driven attention theories (e.g. Kruschke, 2001) predict that 
after training on FD → com and GE → rare, D and E will not be differentially 
attended, due to the absence of a shared cue (the shared cue A being the thing that 
drives attention towards C on AC trials, according to these theories). We therefore 
also predicted that no SN should be observed for E relative to D. Cues E and D thus 
provide a frequency-matched control for the C − B SN. Confirmation of these 
predictions would provide further support for these error-driven attention theories of 
the IBRE. 
 In the IBRE procedure, and as described in Table 1, during training the cues are 
presented solely as part of compounds. For our stimuli one could not separate the ERP 
effects elicited by individual cues within a compound; other methodologies, 
particularly eye-tracking, are better suited for achieving such separation (Kruschke et 
al., 2005). Hence, as in Wills et al. (2007), an EEG analysis of the training phase of 
the current study would be uninformative for the hypotheses under test. We therefore 
did not perform an EEG analysis of the training phase (for further discussion of this 
decision, see the General Discussion). Instead, following Wills et al. (2007), we 
examined the ERPs in a test phase during which the cues B and C (and D and E) were 
presented individually, and the SN computed as the difference waveform of these two 
trial types. Subsequent testing of singly presented cues avoids the difficulty of 
attempting to detect within-stimulus attentional allocation with an ERP methodology, 
and provides a particularly stringent test for error-driven attention theories. Such 
theories hypothesize that attentional allocation is persistent and should be observable 
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outside the original training context. This issue is returned to in more detail in the 
General Discussion. 
 One shortcoming of Wills et al. (2007), and of a number of other related 
experiments (Beesley & Le Pelley, 2011; Le Pelley, 2010; Le Pelley et al., 2011, in 
press; Livesey, Harris, & Harris, 2009), is that the cues expected to differ in 
attentional allocation showed a corresponding difference in response accuracy during 
the test phase (or, in the case of Le Pelley et al., in press, the difference is not directly 
measured but can be inferred). In other words, the cue predicted to be more attended 
was also responded to more accurately than the cue predicted to be less attended. As 
discussed by Wills et al. (2007), this leaves open the possibility that we pay more 
attention to those things for which we already know the answer; in other words, 
attention is a consequence of learning. Although this is not an unreasonable 
hypothesis, error-driven attention theory assumes that changes in attention lead to 
differences in rate of learning (and hence accuracy), not (just) the other way around. 
 One useful feature of the inverse base-rate design is that it provides the potential 
for dissociating response accuracy from predicted attentional allocation. As 
previously discussed, error-driven attention theory predicts that C will be more 
attended than B. However, cue B is also presented more often than cue C during 
training so it seems possible that, in a subsequent test, participants would be more 
accurate on B presented alone than on C presented alone. Thus, in the inverse base-
rate design, one might expect to see a dissociation of response accuracy (B > C) from 
attentional allocation (C > B). If this dissociation is observed, then it seems unlikely 
that our results could be explained by the idea that people attend to things for which 
they already know the answer. Such a pattern of results would increase support for an 
error-driven attention account of the IBRE. 
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1.4. The current study 
 We employ the basic paradigm of Wills et al. (2007) to implement an inverse 
base-rate training design (see Table 1), followed by a subsequent test phase that 
includes the critical test items B, C, D and E, presented individually. These four 
individually presented cues are the focus of the event-related potential analysis. The 
test phase also includes the behavioral test items A, BC and DE, which behaviorally 
test for the presence of the IBRE and the shared-cue effect in participants’ 
responding. The behavioral test items are critical for establishing the presence of the 
IBRE in our study, but are uninformative in terms of the EEG analysis. In particular, 
and as previously discussed, it is not possible in our procedure to detect attention 
within stimulus compounds – for example, to distinguish between attention to B and 
attention to C when stimulus compound BC is presented. Thus, these behavioral test 
items do not form part of the event-related potential analysis (there are, in any case, 
insufficient trials for a meaningful ERP analysis of the behavioral test items, which 
were presented less frequently than the ERP test items in order to reduce overall 
session length). ERP test items B and C also serve as a behavioral test of the relative 
response accuracy of these two cues, where the result B > C for accuracy, if found in 
conjunction with a Selection Negativity for C relative to B, would be incompatible 
with an account of attention as a mere consequence of superior learning, thus 
providing support for an error-driven attention account of the IBRE. 
 The event-related potential methodology requires a large number of test trials, 
and performance should ideally be stable over the test period. In order to achieve this, 
we tripled the number of cues relative to the abstract design shown in Table 1. Thus, 
A represents three distinct cues (A1, A2, A3), similarly for B, and so on. A review of 
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the literature on the IBRE reveals that doubling or tripling the number of cues is 
common practice (Bohil et al., 2005; Juslin et al., 2001; Lamberts & Kent, 2007; 
Kalish, 2001; Kruschke, 1996; Medin & Bettger, 1991; Medin & Edelson, 1988; 
Shanks, 1992; Sherman et al., 2009; Wood & Blair, 2011; Winman et al., 2005). A 
review of the same literature also reveals that the frequency difference between 
common and rare outcomes is smaller in the current study than in previous reports of 
the IBRE (the most typical ratio is 3:1, the ratio in the current study was 2:1). We 
were thus taking a calculated risk that we would not observe the IBRE in our study. 
We considered this to be a risk worth taking, as it reduced the overall length of an 
already-long experimental session. 
 Another aspect of the current design that was unusual for studies of the IBRE is 
that further training trials were interspersed within the test phase; this technique was 
also employed by Wills et al. (2007), and it helps maintain stable performance across 
a necessarily long test phase. The current study also used abstract shapes, rather than 
the more typical symptom names. Abstract forms have been used successfully in a 
previous demonstration of the IBRE (e.g. Lamberts & Kent, 2007). Abstract shapes 
were employed here, and in Wills et al. (2007), in order to elicit the brain potential 
associated with attention to the shape/spatial frequency of the stimulus. 
 
2. Materials and Methods 
 
2.1. Participants and apparatus 
 Eighteen right-handed undergraduate students from Exeter University (age 
range: 19–29 years; modal age: 20 years; 9 female, 9 male) participated on a 
voluntary basis. Stimulus presentation and response collection was via a PC and the 
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E-prime package (Version 1.1, Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh, USA). The 
electroencephalogram (EEG) was recorded from 64 Ag/AgCl electrodes embedded in 
an elastic headcap (ElectroCap International, Eaton, OH, USA) connected to Brain 
Amp amplifiers (Brain Products, Munich, Germany). There were 58 scalp electrodes, 
placed in an extended 10-20 configuration; one electrode was placed on the outer 
canthus of each eye, one below and one above the right eye and one on each earlobe. 
The EEG and EOG were sampled at 500 Hz with a 0.016-100 Hz bandpass, the online 
reference at Cz and ground at AFz. 
 
2.2. Stimuli  
 Twenty-one abstract pictures were selected from a pool of 36 items employed in 
several previous studies (Jones et al., 1998; Wills et al., 2007; Wills & McLaren, 
1997; Wills et al., 2000; the pool of items is most clearly illustrated in Jones et al., 
1998, Figure 1), colored red with a yellow outline, and presented against a black 
background. The pictures were 0.64° of visual angle in diameter, presented inside a 
white outline square 2.5° in visual angle. On trials where two pictures were presented, 
they were vertically aligned, one appearing 0.36° of visual angle above the midpoint, 
and the other an equivalent distance below. On trials where one picture was presented, 
it was positioned in the center of the square. 
 
2.3. Procedure 
 Participants were asked to imagine that they worked for a medical referral 
service, and that their job was to predict which of two fictitious diseases (“Jominy 
Fever” or “Phipp’s Syndrome”) each patient had contracted, on the basis of “cell 
bodies” in their blood samples (represented by abstract pictures). The allocation of the 
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labels Jominy Fever and Phipp’s Syndrome to the common and rare disease was 
counterbalanced across participants. The 21 pictures of cell bodies were, separately 
for each participant, randomly divided into seven cell types (three cell bodies each) 
corresponding to the stimulus types A − G in Table 1. Hence, there were three 
instantiations of basic structure shown in Table 1; with each letter in the table 
representing three randomly selected cell bodies. The same two fictitious diseases 
(Jominy Fever and Phipps Syndrome) were used for all three instantiations of the 
abstract design.  
--- Figure 1 about here, please --- 
 The structure of each trial is illustrated in Figure 1. Trials began with the 
presentation of an outline square. After 1 sec, one or two “cell bodies” appeared 
inside the square. Participants were expected to make either a “Jominy” or a 
“Phipp’s” response by pressing one of two keys on a standard PC keyboard. 
Allocation of “Jominy” and “Phipp’s” responses to these two keys was 
counterbalanced across participants. Once the participant had responded, the abstract 
pictures and outline square were replaced with a feedback message that indicated 
whether the participant’s response was correct or incorrect, and also indicated the 
correct response. If no response was made within 2 sec of the onset of the “cell 
bodies”, the screen cleared and the message “Out of Time–Please Speed Up!” was 
presented for 1.5 sec. The next trial followed immediately after this message. In the 
test phase of the experiment, test trials were followed by the uninformative feedback 
message “????–DATA MISSING”. 
 The experiment had two phases, a training phase, followed by a test phase. Trial 
order within each phase was randomized within each of several latent sequential 
blocks; starts of blocks were not signaled to participants in any way. Block length was 
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18 trials for the training phase, with AC and GE trial types each occurring three times 
per block, and AB and FD trial types each occurring six times per block. Block length 
in the test phase was 51 trials—the 18 trials of a training block, plus 33 test trials for 
which feedback was uninformative. The 33 test trials comprised six presentations of 
each of the B, C, D and E stimulus types, plus three presentations of each of the A, 
BC and DE trial types. There were 20 blocks in the training phase and 8 blocks in test 
phase; thus, the training phase comprised a total of 360 trials whilst the test phase 
comprised a total of 408 trials. Each of the three abstract pictures within any given 
stimulus group (i.e. A − G) occurred equally often in each block. 
 
2.4. Electrophysiological analysis 
 Offline, the EEG was low-pass filtered at 40 Hz (24 dB/oct.), re-referenced to 
the averaged ear channels and segmented into 600 ms epochs, comprising 500 ms 
post-stimulus onset plus 100 ms pre-stimulus baseline. Following baseline correction, 
all epochs were inspected for ocular, muscle, movement and other artifacts and the 
contaminated epochs discarded. The remaining epochs were averaged, collapsing 
across response type (Jominy, Phipps) to yield the ERPs for the four stimulus types of 
interest: B, C, D and E. 
 We aimed to analyze the ERPs in a manner that was both comprehensive and 
specific, whilst controlling the rate of false positives in multiple tests (Type 1 error). 
To achieve this, we employed a two-stage procedure. The first stage focused on 
“temporal scanning” of ERPs for any differences between the trial types of interest (B 
vs. C; D vs. E) using a spatially non-specific technique that controls the likelihood of 
Type 1 error. The second stage ascertained the presence of spatially circumscribed 
effects such as SN with a more spatially specific ANOVA-based analysis and tested 
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for the critical interaction between condition (experimental vs. control) and frequency 
(high vs. low). 
 In the first stage, in order to examine the entire ERP waveform for potential 
differences between trial types, the ERPs were submitted to Topographic Analysis of 
Variance (TANOVA; Pascual-Marqui et al., 1995), which examines the differences 
between conditions not at the level of individual electrodes or groups of electrodes, 
but at the level of entire scalp distributions (maps). As a measure of “global” 
dissimilarity, it is well suited for testing multiple time ranges, because it reduces the 
problem of correction for inflation for Type 1 error in multiple tests from two 
dimensions (time x space) to one dimension (time) 1.  TANOVA was run for several 
time-windows (hence the need to control Type 1 error, see footnote). These time 
windows were determined by inspecting the difference map between conditions (i.e. 
the scalp distribution of the C − B difference wave), identifying the points of large 
changes in the scalp distribution and defining the intervals of relative topographic 
stability between these points as the intervals to be analyzed.  Because one would not 
expect the current manipulations to affect very early sensory ERPs (latency < 50 ms), 
time windows were defined in the 50–500 ms post-stimulus-onset range. Relative to 
                                                            
1 TANOVA treats the scalp map of each condition as a vector defined by the scalp 
electrodes (58 in the present analysis). Since the difference between the vectors of 
two experimental conditions (e.g. C − B difference map) is also a vector, one can 
compute the magnitude of this difference map as the square root of the sum of 
squared differences between conditions at each electrode (the length of the difference 
vector). To assess the statistical significance of this difference, we used 5000 random 
permutations – this provides robust, if somewhat conservative, control for Type 1 
error  (Nichols & Holmes, 2002) in performing TANOVA tests repeatedly over the 
entire length (duration) of the ERP. TANOVA has been used successfully in previous 
cognitive ERP paradigms (cf. Lavric, Forstmeier, & Pizzagalli, 2004; Lavric, Mizon, 
& Monsell, 2008). 
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performing TANOVA across all time points (cf. Lavric et al., 2008), defining 
intervals in this way increases statistical sensitivity because it reduces considerably 
the number of tests; note that the temporal autocorrelation of ERP data also renders 
correction for multiple point-by-point tests (see Footnote 1) somewhat conservative.  
 ERPs were referenced to an average-free montage (the average reference) to 
ensure that the contributions of individual electrodes to the TANOVA calculations 
were not determined by their spatial relation to the reference channels (ear channels). 
The graphics (Figures 3 and 4) and ANOVA analyses (below) were based on ear-
referenced data. For completeness, TANOVA was also run on the control pair of 
conditions (D and E). 
 In the second stage of the analysis, the time windows for which TANOVA 
revealed reliable differences were submitted to ANOVAs run on the trial types of 
interest (B and C) along with the control trial types (D and E). Prior to ANOVAs, 
ERP electrodes were averaged in 12 scalp regions covering a 4 (anterior-to-posterior) 
x 3 (laterality) spatial matrix, see Figure 4; region and laterality were both included as 
factors in the ANOVA. The purpose of this grouping was to achieve an optimal 
compromise between spatial specificity and adequate signal-to-noise ratio through 
spatial smoothing, whilst also ensuring complete scalp coverage. The Huynh-Feldt 
correction for violations of sphericity was applied when necessary in ANOVAs 
(uncorrected degrees of freedom are reported). 
 
3. Results 
 Two participants failed to achieve above-chance accuracy in the training phase 
and were excluded from all subsequent behavioral and electrophysiological analyses. 
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3.1. Behavioral results 
 Figure 2 illustrates performance across the training phase. Accuracy was higher 
in the final block of training than the first, F(1, 15) = 105.65, p < .001; higher for 
common (AB, FD) than for rare (AC, GE) stimuli, F(1, 15) = 12.76, p = .003, and 
lower in the presence of a shared cue (AB, AC) than in its absence (FD, GE), F(1, 15) 
= 4.66, p = .047. These factors did not significantly interact, max. F(1, 15) = 2.65, p = 
.125. In the final block of training, the effects of stimulus frequency remained 
significant, F(1, 15) = 15.02, p = .001, as did the effects of a shared cue, F(1, 15) = 
5.12, p = .039. These two factors did not significantly interact, F(1, 15) = 1.43, p = 
.251. The effect of a shared cue on accuracy is not unexpected (the shared cue 
increases associative interference) and it does not affect the interpretability of the 
ERP results (because they are based on difference waveforms).  
 For test item BC, the proportion of common-disease responses was significantly 
lower than the proportion of rare-disease responses, mean common-disease proportion 
= .36, t(15) = 2.24, p = .041, indicating the presence of an inverse base-rate effect. For 
test item A, the proportion of common-disease responses was significantly higher 
than the proportion of rare-disease responses, mean = .69, t(15) = 4.81, p <  .001 
confirming that the IBRE we observed was not due to the relative novelty of the two 
diseases. The proportion of common-disease responses for DE was significantly 
higher than the proportion of rare-disease responses, mean = .95, t(15) = 28.99, p <  
.001 confirming that the IBRE observed was contingent on the presence of a common 
cue, and was not due to the relative novelty of cue C compared to cue B. The 
proportion of common-disease responses to cue B, mean = .88, significantly exceeded 
the proportion of rare-disease responses to cue C, mean = .67, t(15) = 2.88, p = .011, 
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indicating greater response accuracy for cue B than cue C. The presence of this 
difference is important for the demonstration of a dissociation between attention and 
response accuracy. The mean reaction times were BC 731 ms, A 835 ms, DE 785 ms, 
B 731 ms, and C 763 ms.  
 
--- Figures 3 and 4 about here, please --- 
3.2. Event-related potentials.  
 Figure 3 shows ERP waveforms for the conditions of interest (B, C) and the 
control conditions (D, E) for a subset of 12 electrodes. An examination of the time 
course of ERP differences between conditions C and B (Figure 4, top panel) reveals 
several apparent effects. The earliest difference seemed to emerge at ~120-170 ms 
and was characterized by a more positive voltage distribution for the C condition over 
the right-central scalp, followed at ~200-250 ms by a central midline positivity for C. 
From ~250-270 ms the positivity for C became more anterior and increasingly left 
lateralized, and was accompanied by occipital negativity on C trials (relative to B 
trials). This posterior negative and anterior positive distribution of the C − B 
difference was stable until ~320 ms, when the anterior positivity shifted to the 
midline, whilst the posterior negativity remained relatively unchanged until ~360 ms. 
Subsequently, the posterior negativity faded whereas the anterior positivity persisted 
at midline until ~440 ms, after which the positivity for C became more centrally 
distributed and more widespread towards the end of the ERP epoch. 
 Some of the effects in the contrast between the control conditions (E − D, 
Figure 4, middle panel) seemed to resemble the C − B differences: a right-central 
positivity at ~120-170 ms and a mid-central positivity at 230-240 ms. However, there 
were also marked differences, particularly after 200 ms post-stimulus. The anterior 
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positivity (~250-440 ms) and the posterior negativity (270-360 ms) seen in the C − B 
difference are not apparent in the E − D difference maps (there is instead some mid-
central positivity at ~270-330 ms, followed later by mid-central negativity at ~370-
410 ms). Overall, E − D differences appear reduced relative to C − B differences, 
particularly from 200 ms after stimulus onset. 
  
3.2.1. Stage 1 analysis 
 Based on the scalp distribution of the difference waveform, seven time windows 
were defined and submitted to TANOVA of the C − B difference: 50–120 ms, 120–
170 ms, 170–270 ms, 270–320 ms, 320–360 ms, 360–440 ms and 440–500 ms (see 
Figure 4, top panel). TANOVA and the permutation-based correction for multiple 
comparisons found the difference between the scalp maps of B and C trial types to be 
statistically significant in the 270–320 ms time window. This time window was 
associated with scalp distributions characteristic for the posterior selection negativity 
(SN) and frontal selection positivity (SP) (see Figure 4, top panel). The SN was right 
lateralized and the SP was left lateralized, possibly suggesting overlapping intra-
cerebral generators; the magnitudes of the SN and SP were comparable. The 
differences between the B and C conditions were not significant in the other time-
windows, the nearest to significance (p = 0.11, corrected for multiple comparisons) 
was the difference in the immediately following time window (320–360 ms), 
characterized by some persistence of the SN and a shift in the distribution of the SP to 
a more midline positivity. A similar set of time windows was defined for the E − D 
difference (see Figure 4, middle panel). TANOVA found no statistically significant 
effects in any of these time-windows (largest p = 0.3, corrected). 
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3.2.2. Stage 2 analysis 
 In order to better characterize the difference revealed by TANOVA between the 
B and C conditions, ERP amplitudes in the 270–320 ms time window were submitted 
to a condition (B vs. C) by anterior-posterior (4) by laterality (3) ANOVA. As 
expected the condition by anterior-posterior interaction was reliable, F (3, 45) = 5.66, 
p = 0.002, confirming the presence of the posterior SN along with the anterior SP. 
The interaction between condition and laterality was nearly significant, F(2, 30) = 
2.82, p = 0.075, suggesting a tendency for the lateralization of these effects. No main 
effects or interactions were significant in the corresponding ANOVA comparing D 
and E. In order to confirm that the B vs. C difference was not reducible to effects of 
the difference in their frequency, the ERP amplitudes in the two scalp regions where 
SN and SP were observed (left frontal and right occipital) were submitted to an 
ANOVA along with the corresponding regions for the control conditions D and E. 
The critical interaction between condition (experimental vs. control), frequency (high 
vs. low), and region (left frontal vs. right occipital) was statistically significant, F (1, 
15) = 4.72, p = 0.046. 
 
4. Discussion 
 We reported an ERP investigation of the inverse base-rate effect (IBRE), a 
paradoxical yet robust phenomenon in predictive learning. Participants were trained 
that stimulus compound AB predicted a frequently occurring outcome, whilst AC 
predicted a rare outcome. As expected on the basis of previous behavioral studies 
(e.g. Medin & Edelson, 1988), participants inferred that BC predicted the rare 
outcome. This inference seems non-rational, but can be predicted by certain error-
driven attention theories of predictive learning (e.g. Kruschke, 2001b). Such theories 
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predict that, under conditions where there is a shared cue (A) and where AB is more 
frequent than AC, C will come to be more attended than B. This difference in 
attention is assumed to dominate responding to BC. On the basis of this prediction, 
combined with an extensive literature on the ERP correlates of selective attention 
(Hillyard & Anllo-Vento, 1998), we predicted and observed a posterior selection 
negativity (SN), and a concurrent frontal selection positivity (SP), for C relative to B 
in the test phase of our IBRE procedure. The frontal SP seemed to also be present in 
the time-window preceding the SN, though this effect was not statistically reliable.  
 We further predicted that no corresponding effect would be observed for a pair 
of control stimuli (D and E), which had the same relative frequency as B and C, but 
for which there was no shared cue during training (and hence for which no IBRE 
should be observed according to error-driven attention theory). These predictions 
were also confirmed, with participants inferring that DE predicted the common 
outcome, and with the E versus D difference in the ERPs being both non-significant, 
and significantly smaller than the C versus B difference. 
 The SN for C relative to B was observed under conditions where response 
accuracy for B exceeded response accuracy for C. Consequently, it appears that C was 
both the more attended stimulus and the one about which participants were less 
certain. This dissociation between attention and response accuracy appears difficult to 
explain if one assumes that the attentional differences observed merely reflect people 
attending to those stimuli for which they know the outcome. Such an account suffices 
for the only previous study of error-driven attention in predictive learning to use an 
ERP methodology (Wills et al., 2007), and it can also accommodate a range of results 
using eye-tracking and other methodologies (Beesley & Le Pelley, 2011; Le Pelley, 
2010; Le Pelley et al., 2011; Livesey et al., 2009). However, for the current results, 
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such an account is disconfirmed, due to the presence of the aforementioned 
dissociation. 
 The occipital negativity we documented in response to C relative to B had a 
later onset than the ‘classical’ SN which, according to the influential review by 
Hillyard and Anllo-Vento (1998) emerges between 125 and 200 ms. However, the 
early SN literature was based on discriminating (typically) one or two basic feature(s), 
such as color, orientation, spatial frequency, direction of apparent motion, etc., 
defined a-priori and explicitly for the participant. In contrast, in our procedure 
participants had to discriminate the cues based on complex features with which they 
were not initially familiar. The onset of SNs reported for complex target object 
discriminations (e.g. letters/symbols, Potts & Tucker, 2001; photographic images, 
Schupp et al., 2007) is at ~200-250 ms following the stimulus onset, which is more in 
line with our data. The topography of the ERP in the range of the SN in these studies 
(with a prominent frontal positivity accompanying the occipital negativity) is also 
consistent with the topography we documented.  
 
4.1. Theories of the inverse base-rate effect 
 In the current article, we employed the term “error-driven attention theory” as a 
natural language approximation for a class of mathematically expressed theories of 
learning. This was a simplification, as this class of theories is not homogenous, and 
different members vary in the extent to which they can accommodate the results we 
have presented. In the current section, we consider the application of some specific 
members of the class to our data. 
 One of the earlier formal expressions of error-driven attention theory is due to 
Mackintosh (1975; see also Sutherland & Mackintosh, 1971).  Mackintosh’s (1975) 
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formulation of error-driven attention theory (hereafter, Mack75) is not consistent with 
the current results because response accuracy for B presented alone exceeds that for C 
presented alone in our experiment. In Mack75, the associative strength for B must 
therefore exceed that for C, and thus the dominant response to BC is predicted to be 
the same as that for B. This is opposite to our current study, where the dominant 
response to BC is the same as for C (an inverse base-rate effect). Hence, Mack75 
cannot predict the presence of an IBRE in our experiment. 
 Kruschke’s EXIT model (Kruschke, 2001b), however, can accommodate the 
presence of an IBRE under conditions where the response accuracy for B presented 
alone exceeds the response strength for C presented alone; this ability is illustrated in 
previously published simulations of the EXIT model, see Kruschke (2003, Table 1). 
One reason EXIT succeeds where Mack75 fails is that in the former attention affects 
both responding and future learning, whilst in the latter it only affects future learning. 
EXIT learns to direct attention toward C in AC during training, because doing so 
reduces the likelihood of the error that would otherwise be caused by the association 
of A to the common disease. At test, the presentation of compound BC leads to 
attention being directed towards C, due to the similarity of BC to AC. If this 
attentional allocation is sufficiently strong, C can dominate responding, leading to an 
IBRE. Of course, BC is also similar to training item AB, but attentional re-allocation 
is not required to respond correctly to AB during training, so the overall effect is that 
when BC is presented at test, C is attended more than B.  
 A further critical aspect of EXIT that allows it to accommodate our results is 
that learned attention is normalized before it exerts its effect on responding. This is 
important because on trials such as B and C, where only one stimulus component is 
presented, the presented component is fully in control of responding; it is only where 
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multiple stimulus components are presented (e.g. BC) that learned attention affects 
the relative control those components have over responding. This permits the model 
to predict more accurate responding to B alone than to C alone, despite the greater 
learned attention to C than to B. A consequence of this formulation is that, if EXIT is 
the correct account of the IBRE, then the Selection Negativity in the current study 
presumably reflects pre-normalized learned attention in the EXIT model. This might 
be because normalization takes time and the Selection Negativity is quite an early 
component. It might alternatively be because the Selection Negativity indexes activity 
in EXIT’s gain nodes; the gain nodes represent non-normalized learned attention in 
EXIT, which is subsequently normalized further down the processing stream. 
However, in the absence of further data, further speculation would be inappropriate. 
 In the current paper, we have focused on the class of error-driven attention 
learning theory exemplified by Mack75 and EXIT. An alternative class of theory is 
that attention is directed towards stimuli that are followed by surprising outcomes 
(e.g. Pearce & Hall, 1980; Wagner, 1978). There is at least one published theory of 
the IBRE within this alternative framework (Shanks, 1992). As things stand, this class 
of account seems to suffer from the same problem as Mack75 and for the same reason 
– in other words, it cannot predict an IBRE under conditions where response accuracy 
to B alone exceeds that to C alone, because attention is assumed to affect only future 
learning, not responding.  However, it seems entirely possible that such accounts 
could be modified along the lines of the EXIT model in order to accommodate this 
result (i.e. the addition of a process where attention affects responding, not just future 
learning).  
 Yet another type of error-driven attention theory states that attentional 
allocation occurs at the level of stimulus dimensions, rather than at the level of 
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particular stimulus features within those dimensions. Sutherland and Mackintosh 
(1971), and the Generalized Context Model (Nosofsky, 1984), are examples of this 
class of account. Recent work by Johansen et al. (2010) suggests that feature-based 
attention is a better model of the IBRE than dimension-based attention. 
 Other than error-driven attention theories, we are not aware of any other class of 
explanation that can account for the results observed in the current study. The class of 
theory most similar to error-driven attentional theory states that prediction errors gate 
learning about outcomes; in other words, predictive relationships between cues and 
outcomes are learned to the extent that the outcomes they predict are not already well 
predicted (Schultz et al., 1997; Rescorla & Wagner, 1972; Gluck, 1992; Harris, 2006). 
Such theories do not incorporate stimulus-based attention per se, but they can 
accommodate a range of attentional phenomena in learning via the additional 
assumption that stimuli strongly associated to an outcome attract attention. Such 
theories cannot accommodate the dissociation between attention and response 
accuracy observed in the current study. Indeed, standard versions of these theories 
cannot accommodate the IBRE (Markman, 1989). Some stimulus-sampling variants 
of these theories can accommodate the behavioral phenomena in the current study 
(e.g. Gluck, 1992), but they have no mechanism by which they can explain the 
dissociation of response accuracy from attention. 
 Bayesian inference provides another class of account of predictive learning 
(Anderson, 1991; Sanborn et al., 2010). Although there have been some attempts to 
accommodate the IBRE within a Bayesian framework (Anderson, 1991), such 
accounts struggle to accommodate the known IBRE behavioral phenomena 
(Kruschke, 2006). This is perhaps unsurprising given that Bayesian accounts assume 
human inference is approximately rational, and the IBRE appears to be a strikingly 
 28 
non-rational phenomenon. Kruschke (2006) proposes that the IBRE can be 
accommodated within a Bayesian framework by assuming that predictive learning is 
locally rather than globally Bayesian. Specifically, Kruschke assumes the presence of 
a locally-Bayesian subsystem that determines attentional allocation, feeding into a 
subsequent locally-Bayesian subsystem that infers cue-outcome relationships on the 
basis of attentionally-modulated input. In the context of the IBRE, such an account 
has much in common with error-driven attentional theories. 
 Mitchell et al. (2009) state that theories such as Mackintosh (1975) and 
Kruschke (2001b) are usually assumed to describe the operation of an automatic link-
formation mechanism; the intended implication being that such theories predict 
learning and attentional allocation to be automatic, uninstructable and unconscious. 
The position taken in the current article is that error-driven attentional theories of 
predictive learning are largely silent about such issues. In agreement with Mitchell et 
al. (2009), our position is that nothing in those theories, or in the data of the current 
study, discounts the rather likely possibility that the phenomena we have observed are 
mediated and moderated by conscious, deliberate processes. 
 
4.2. Critiques and limitations 
 One potential criticism of the current study, and of Wills et al. (2007), is that 
theories of error-driven attention assume attentional re-allocation occurs during 
training as a result of prediction errors produced by compound cues, whilst the current 
methodology assesses attention toward single cues in a post-training test phase. In 
response, we’d argue that the current methodology provides a particularly 
illuminating test of such theories, because they predict (as discussed above) that 
attentional allocation persists beyond the original training context. The current results 
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imply that this is indeed the case, providing additional support for such theories. 
Nevertheless, one possible topic for future research would be to examine the N2pc 
component (Eimer, 1996; Kiss et al., 2007; Luck & Hillyard, 1994) with respect to 
stimuli BC and DE. Such an analysis was not possible in the current study because 
our stimuli were small and centrally positioned. This was a deliberate choice, 
designed to minimize eye-movement artifacts, and to maximize comparability with 
Wills et al. (2007). An investigation of the N2pc would require the two components 
of the compound cues (e.g. BC) to be left-right lateralized. 
 The current study focused on a test-phase analysis of ERPs locked to stimulus 
onset; this was because we had clear predictions about what would be observed, 
predictions made on the basis of previous work (Wills et al., 2007) and formal theory 
(Kruschke, 2001b). Those predictions were confirmed. A complementary approach to 
studying the electrophysiology of predictive learning is to consider training-phase 
ERPs locked to the onset of feedback (Luque et al., 2012; see also Moris et al., in 
press). This approach represents an important contribution to the study of the 
electrophysiology of predictive learning; it was not pursued in the current study for 
two reasons.  
 The first reason was a lack of any clear predictions concerning event-related 
potentials during training that would allow one to distinguish error-driven attentional 
theories of the IBRE from other classes of account.  More generally, it is hard to see 
how event-related potentials to vertically-presented compound stimuli could be 
informative with regard to selective attention to an element of that compound (e.g., 
attention to B in AB or C in AC). The second reason was that, even if such 
predictions could be derived, analysis of event-related potentials during training poses 
seemingly insurmountable technical issues in the current study. Performance during 
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the training phase of a predictive learning study is, by definition, dynamic. 
Participants start the training phase at chance, and end with high levels of 
performance. Meaningful analysis thus requires subdivision of the training phase into 
a series of sub-sections for which error rate is relatively homogenous. However, given 
the relatively rapid rate of learning in such studies, these sub-divisions result in too 
few trials per sub-section for a meaningful ERP analysis. The solution to this problem 
employed by Luque et al. (2012) was to ask each participant to learn the same abstract 
structure 30 times within the same session. However, the length and complexity of 
our behavioral procedure (relative to Luque’s) rendered this solution impractical in 
the current study.  
 For similar reasons, we did not conditionalize our analysis of stimulus-locked 
ERPs by response type (common disease predicted vs. rare disease predicted). For 
example, about one third of responses to test item C predicted the common disease, 
whilst two-thirds predicted the rare disease. Thus, there was an average of 16 trials 
per participant for the common-disease response to C; insufficient for a clear ERP 
analysis.  Although in principle it would have been possible to extend the test session, 
the experiment was already rather long and, as far as we are aware, current theories 
make no clear predictions about the outcome of such an analysis.  
Turning to possible critiques of our behavioral data, it is noticeable that 
response accuracy at test for the perfect predictors (B and C) was lower than in some 
previous studies of the IBRE. For example, Kruschke (1996, Experiment 1) reports a 
perfect predictor response accuracy of 0.92 (when averaged across B and C), while in 
the current study the corresponding figure is 0.78. However, the IBRE has been 
observed across a wide range of perfect-predictor response accuracies, ranging from 
0.60 in Juslin et al. (2001, Experiment 3) to 0.95 in Johansen et al. (2007, Experiment 
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3). The current study sits roughly in the middle of that range. Accuracy on the perfect 
predictors at test is presumably a function of a number of variables, including length 
of training and the type of stimuli employed.  
As previously discussed, response accuracy for the common perfect predictor 
(B) exceeded response accuracy for the rare perfect predictor (C) in the current study. 
An informal review of the literature indicates that both B > C (Bohil et al., 2005; 
Juslin et al., 2001; Medin & Edelson, 1988; Winman et al., 2005) and C > B (Juslin et 
al., 2001; Kruschke, 1996; Lamberts & Kent, 2007; Medin & Edelson, 1988; Wood & 
Blair, 2011) are observed in different studies of the IBRE. There is some indication 
that B > C becomes more likely as mean performance on B and C increases, with no 
reports of B > C in studies where mean accuracy is substantially below .8. Mean 
accuracy in the current study was 0.78, and hence the presence of the B > C pattern 
was not entirely unexpected. Nevertheless, further research is required to adequately 
determine what causes the presence of B > C versus C > B, and whether error-driven 
attention theories provide the best account of the IBRE in conditions where C > B.  
 Finally, the SN observed in the current study is later than that observed in Wills 
et al. (2007). Although the two studies employed similar stimulus elements, the 
designs were quite different. Notably, in the current design (but not in Wills et al., 
2007) certain cues are, from the outset, encountered in two different compounds (e.g. 
A in AB and in AC). This may have necessitated more thorough perceptual analysis 
in the current study, delaying the onset of the SN relative to Wills et al. (2007).  
 
4.3. Conclusions 
 We presented the first electrophysiological investigation of the inverse base-rate 
effect, a robust non-rational bias in predictive learning. Error-driven attention theory 
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predicts both the presence of the inverse base-rate effect, and the presence of a 
corresponding attentional ERP component, in our study. It further predicts the 
absence of an inverse base-rate effect, and the absence of the corresponding ERP 
component, under conditions where there is no shared cue during training. These 
results were observed. No other class of theory appears able to accommodate these 
results. 
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Figure Captions 
 
Figure 1. Trial structure. 
 
Figure 2. Accuracy in the training phase as a function of stimulus type (see Table 1) 
and training block. Each plot point is the mean of two consecutive training blocks 
(blocks 1& 2, 3 & 4, … 19 & 20).  
 
Figure 3. ERP waveforms for the conditions of interest (B, C) and the control 
conditions (D, E) shown for a subset of 12 electrodes; as in the actual EEG cap, 
lateral electrodes vary in their distances from the midline (e.g., F5, C3, O1). 
Inspection of the waveforms reveals from ~250-300 ms a more negative-going ERP 
for C relative to B at posterior electrodes (particularly over the right hemiscalp) and 
more positive amplitudes for C relative to B over frontal electrodes (particularly over 
the left hemiscalp); neither effect is apparent in the D vs. E contrast (see Fig. 3 for the 
scalp distribution of the contrasts between the two pairs of conditions). 
 
Figure 4. ERP contrasts presented in the upper and middle panels as spherical spline 
interpolated difference maps framed to represent windows used for TANOVA (the 
solid red frame with grey fill shows the window of reliable differences corrected for 
multiple tests; the broken red frame shows the window that approached significance), 
and in the lower panel as ERP plots for representative electrodes; a schematic of the 
scalp regions used in the ANOVA is also shown. 
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